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CRIMINAL LAW-ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT-A MAN'S
HOME Is His CASTLE.-Paylon v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
The appeals of two similar cases, Payton v. New York and Rid-
dick v. New York, were consolidated to consider the constitutional-
ity of New York statutes authorizing police "to enter a private
residence without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to make a
routine felony arrest."'
Payton v. New York-Facts
Believing Theodore Payton had murdered a gas station man-
ager two days earlier, New York detectives went to his apartment at
7:30 A.M. to arrest him. They had no warrant although there was
probable cause and ample time to obtain one. Light and music were
coming from inside the apartment but there was no response to the
detective's knock. They then sent for help and, about thirty min-
utes later, police entered after breaking open the metal apartment
door with crowbars. No one was home but in open sight was a
thirty caliber shell casing that officers seized and later had admitted
as evidence at Payton's murder trial. The police then searched the
apartment thoroughly, seizing other evidence indicating Payton's
guilt.
The next day Payton surrendered and was subsequently in-
dicted for murder. At the suppression hearing the prosecutor ac-
knowledged that most of the evidence seized in Payton's apartment
was the result of an illegal search and should not be admitted into
evidence. However, he contended, because the warrantless, forcible
entry to arrest Payton was authorized by a New York statute,2 the
1. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 574 (1980).
2. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 177-178 (McKinney 1958) (repealed 1971), in effect at
the time of this entry, provided in pertinent part:
§ 177. In what cases allowed.
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person,
3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for
believing the person to be arrested to have committed it.
§ 178. May break open a door or window, if admittance is refused.
To make an arrest, as provided in the last section, the officer may break open
an outer or inner door or window of a building, if, after notice of his office and
purpose, he be refused admittance.
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"plain view doctrine' 3 validated the seizure of the shell casing; it
was properly admissible at trial. The judge agreed. The Appellate
Division affirmed Payton's murder conviction.4
Riddick v. New York-Facts
In June 1973 two victims identified Obie Riddick as the man
who had robbed them in 1971. Although police found out where
Riddick lived in January 1974 they did not bother to obtain a war-
rant before they went to his home to arrest him about noon on
March 14 the same year. When they knocked, Riddick's three-year-
old son opened the door. Seeing Riddick sitting in bed covered with
a sheet, they rushed in and arrested him. Before allowing him to
dress, however, they made a Chimel-type search 5 of the bedroom.
In a chest of drawers near the bed they found narcotics and related
paraphernalia. When Riddick was indicted-not for robbery but
for narcotics violations-he moved to suppress the evidence. The
trial judge ruled that the warrantless entry into Riddick's home and
his subsequent arrest were authorized by the revised New York stat-
ute;6 therefore, the search of the immediate area was proper and the
3. "[An object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest ... under ex-
isting law may be seized without a warrant." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465
(1971).
4. People v. Payton, 55 A.D.2d 859, 390 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1976) (mem.).
5. "There is ample justification ... for a search of the arrestee's person and the area
'within his immediate control'--construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
6. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.15(4) (McKinney 1971) provides in pertinent part:
In order to effect such an arrest, a police officer may enter premises in which
he reasonably believes such person to be present, under the same circumstances
and in the same manner as would be authorized, by the provisions of subdivisions
four and five of section 120.80, if he were attempting to make such arrest pursuant
to a warrant of arrest.
Id. § 120.80 (amended 1980) provides in pertinent part:
4. In order to effect the arrest, the police officer may, under circumstances
and in a manner prescribed in this subdivision, enter any premises in which he
reasonably believes the defendant to be present. Before such entry, he must give,
or make reasonable effort to give notice of his authority and purpose to an occu-
pant thereof, unless there is reasonable cause to believe that the giving of such
notice will:
(a) Result in the defendant escaping or attempting to escape; or
(b) Endanger the life or safety of the officer or another person; or
(c) Result in the destruction, damaging or secretion of material evidence.
5. If the officer is authorized to enter premises without giving notice of his
authority and purpose, or if after giving such notice he is not admitted, he may
enter such premises, and by a breaking if necessary.
evidence seized was admissible. The Appellate Division affirmed
Riddick's conviction for criminal possession of a controlled sub-
stance.7
The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases
and affirmed both convictions. The court stated that the scope of an
intrusion on the privacy of the home for the purpose of making an
arrest was minimal compared to the scope of an intrusion for the
purpose of making an intensive search of a person's belongings. It
also reasoned that the community had a legitimate interest in appre-
hending purported felons.8
The Decisions
The United States Supreme Court accepted the cases to resolve
the issue expressly left unanswered in several previous opinions, 9
namely whether police may, in the absence of exigent circum-
stances,' 0 enter a suspect's home to make an arrest without either a
warrant or the consent of a responsible occupant. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution" "prohibits the police from making a warrant-
less and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make
a routine felony arrest."'
12
Although there is an abundance of fourth amendment history
regarding the validity of warrantless entries into a home to conduct
a search, there is little mention of warrantless entry to make an ar-
rest. The courts have generally assumed such entries to be constitu-
tional 3 and ignored the question.' 4
7. People v. Riddick, 56 A.D.2d 937, 392 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1977) (mem.).
8. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 310-11, 380 N.E.2d 224, 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395,
400 (1978).
9. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493
(1958).
10. Emergency conditions which justify immediate action, e.g., hot pursuit, danger of
physical harm to a person, response to an emergency, evidence in the process of being de-
stroyed, or evidence in the process of being removed from the jurisdiction. See Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
11. U.S. Const. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
12. 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
13. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
NOTES1981]
98 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:95
The validity of this assumption was first questioned in Jones v.
United States. 5 There the Court observed in dictum that a war-
rantless entry at night to arrest would present a "grave constitutional
question" which it did not have to consider.'6 Later, in Collidge v.
New Hampshire7 the Court quoted this passage from Jones with
approval and suggested that re-examination of the assumption
might be prudent."8
In several cases since that time the question has been expressly
avoided, most notably in United States v. Watson 19 where the Court
in a footnote stated that the case did not present the "still unsettled
question. . . whether and under what circumstances an officer may
enter a suspect's home to make a warrantless arrest."1
20
In Payton the Court answered the question, thereby settling the
conflict of opinion that had developed in the circuit courts of ap-
peals and in the courts of last resort in several states. Those courts
that had squarely faced the issue of whether warrantless entry to
arrest was constitutional had developed two distinctly opposite lines
of opinion.
The majority view was that the police violated the fourth
amendment if they entered a person's home to make an arrest with-
out either a warrant, the consent of a responsible resident, or exigent
circumstances.2
(1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699
(1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
14. See C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES AND CONCEPTS § 3.04 (1980).
15. 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
16. Id. at 499, 500.
17. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
18. Id. at 480.
19. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
20. Id. at 418 n.6.
21. United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Prescott, 581
F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 439 U.S. 913 (1978); United
States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494 (2d
Cir. 1977); United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1064 (1977); United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Shye,
492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974); Salvador v. United States, 505 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1974); Vance
v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc); State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 564 P.2d 877 (1977); People v.
Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976);
People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 491 P.2d 575 (1971); State v. Jones, 274 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa
1979); State v. Platten, 225 Kan. 764, 594 P.2d 201 (1979); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367
Mass. 798, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975); State v. Olson, 287 Or. 157, 598 P.2d 670 (1979); Com-
monwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A.2d 1177 (1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 (1980);
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The minority view22 was that such entries did not violate the
fourth amendment if probable cause was present because, histori-
cally, the practice had been condoned. Moreover, it frequently was
authorized by state statute. The courts thought this reflected the
judgment of the community that it was more important to appre-
hend criminals than to protect the privacy of the home.
23
Before addressing the question presented by these appeals, Mr.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, first made clear the issues
that had not been considered.24 The Court did not examine these
cases for the presence of exigent circumstances that would have jus-
tified the intrusions. Both cases were treated as routine felony ar-
rests in which the police had probable cause and ample time to
obtain a warrant but did not do so. Neither did the Court consider
when, if ever, the police may enter a third person's home without a
warrant to effect an arrest. The opinion addressed only the narrow
issue of whether a routine felony arrest on the suspect's residential
premises is valid without a warrant.
The majority opinion was founded on the ancient adage "[A]
man's house is his castle. ' 25 The Court noted the importance placed
on the sanctity of the home in several of its prior decisions. 26 It
reiterated that protecting the privacy of the home from governmen-
tal intrusion is the whole purpose of the fourth amendment, quot-
ing from United States v. United States District Court:27 the
"physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the word-
ing of the Fourth Amendment is directed. 28
After establishing that an arrest is "quintessentially a seizure"
29
State v. McNeal, 251 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1978); Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 267 N.W.2d
278 (1978).
22. United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Burnett,
526 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976); United States ex rel. Wright v.
Woods, 432 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 966 (1971); Michael v. United
States, 393 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1968); State v. Perez, 277 So. 2d 778 (Fla.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1064 (1973); State v. Linkletter, 345 So. 2d 452 (La. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016
(1978); People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978); State v.
Luellen, 17 Wash. App. 91, 562 P.2d 253 (1977).
23. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 311-12,380 N.E.2d 224, 229-30, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395,
400-01 (1978).
24. 445 U.S. 573, 582-83 (1980).
25. Id. at 596.
26. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
27. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
28. Id. at 313.
29. 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting J. Powell's concurring opinion in United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976)). See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
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required by the fourth amendment to be reasonable, the Court re-
jected the New York Court of Appeals' conclusion that an entry for
the purpose of conducting a search for objects is a greater intrusion
than an entry for the purpose of conducting a search for a person to
make an arrest. The crucial point, in the majority's opinion, was not
the purpose of the entry, but thefact of the entry. The Court stated:
The two intrusions share this fundamental characteristic:
the breach of the entrance to an individual's home. The Fourth
Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of set-
tings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than
when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual's home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific
constitutional terms: "The right of the people to be secure in
their. . houses. . . shall not be violated." That language un-
equivocally establishes the proposition that "[a]t the very core [of
the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into
his own home and there be free from unreasonable government
intrusion." [citations omitted]. In terms that apply equally to
seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably
be crossed without a warrant.3°
As urged by New York, the Court next applied to the instant
case each of the three criteria relied upon in United States v. Wat-
son 3' to uphold a warrantless arrest in public and found no support
for allowing similar practices on private premises.
First, the Court was able to find no definitive common law rule
permitting arrest without a warrant in private places as opposed to
"the well-settled common-law rule that a warrantless arrest in a
public place is valid if the arresting officer had probable cause to
believe the suspect is a felon."32 In fact, the Court found a strong
disagreement about the question among such common-law com-
mentators as Coke, Blackstone, and Hale.
33
The second point used to support public warrantless arrests in
Watson was the "clear consensus among the States" that the prac-
tice was desirable. In this case, the Court said that although many
states have statutes similar to New York's, support for the practice
has recently declined and that "virtually all" of the courts that have
30. 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
31. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
32. 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
33. Id. at 591-98.
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directly confronted the issue have ruled these entries invalid.34
The third point relied upon in Watson was that Congress had
expressly stamped the practice of making warrantless arrests in pub-
lic "reasonable" by giving federal officers authority to make public
warrantless arrests. 35 The Court found no such Congressional sup-
port for warrantless arrests on private premises.
36
The Court also found it unnecessary to consider the practical
and policy consequences of a warrant requirement in light of the
clear constitutional mandate: "[N]either history nor this Nation's
experience requires us to disregard the overriding respect for the
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since
the origins of the Republic.
37
In contrast, the dissent38 read the common law and the history
of the fourth amendment as specifically allowing warrantless arrest
entries. The dissenters also thought that the warrant requirement
would hamper police and force them to make frequently difficult
on-the-spot decisions resulting in "endless litigation with respect to
the existence of exigent circumstances. ' 39 Additionally, the dissent-
ing justices felt the judgment of state legislators should have been
given greater deference.4'
The Payton rule requiring police to have a warrant before en-
tering private premises to arrest in the absence of exigent circum-
stances will affect the law in about one-half the states, 4' including
Arkansas.42 Those state statutes authorizing forcible entry to arrest
will have to be rewritten by legislatures to require a warrant or the
courts will have to read the requirement into the existing statutes.
Otherwise, a routine arrest inside the home will be invalid.
The decision also emphasizes the Court's reverence for the
sanctity of the home. It emphatically declares that only extreme
34. Id. at 598-99. See also notes 21 and 22 supra.
35. 445 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1980).
36. Id. at 601.
37. Id. at 601 (footnote by the Court omitted).
38. Mr. Justice White wrote the dissenting opinion with the Chief Justice [Burger] and
Mr. Justice Rehnquist joining.
39. 445 U.S. 573, 620 (1980) (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24
(1976)).
40. 445 U.S. 573, 614 (1980).
41. Id. at 598-99 n.46.
42. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-414 (1977).
"To make an arrest, an officer may break open the door of a house in which the defend-
ant may be, after having demanded admittance, and explained the purpose for which admit-
tance is desired."
19811
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emergency can outweigh the individual's interest in preserving the
privacy of his home. Although this decision does little to help clear
up the doctrinal muddle of the fourth amendment, the Court
reached a logical conclusion in light of its overriding respect for the
home.
The decision, when viewed from a balancing of the interests
perspective, is consistent with both the desire to maintain effective
law enforcement and the desire to guarantee to all citizens that the
police will not transgress on their property except in cases of abso-
lute necessity. A person now has the same protection from govern-
mental intrusion to arrest in his home that he has long enjoyed from
governmental intrusion to search.
Nancy Marian Epperson
